由于代理企业能力和努力程度的信息不对称,运用信号博弈和激励约束模型的分析发现:战略联盟核心企业在甄选阶段应提出具有较高强度的信号要求,确定能避免逆向选择的信息租金额;建立适用于不同类型代理企业的激励契约,向高能力者收取一定质量保证金后配以较低程度的质量激励,向低能力合作者提供质量补贴后配以较高程度的质量激励。
Because of information asymmetry of agent enterprise capabilities and effort,this paper employed signal gamming and incentive-restraint model and finds that,in the selection stage,the core enterprise should take a high-strength signal requirement to fix proper information rent by avoiding adverse selection.It establishes a general incentive contract:asking for quality bail in the high-capability enterprise with lower service quality incentives while rendering some allowance for the low-capability enterprise before providing higher service incentives.