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中文摘要：
电网商业投资在电力市场中将受到电网管理体制和运行机制的影响。而将电网产权和电网调度分离会产生“道德风险”问题，以最简单的商业性电网投资模式为例，通过数学模型分析了三种情况下电网公司和电网调度机构的道德风险问题，并研究了不同输电权机制下的电网检修问题，基于上述分析，认为：电网及电网调度机构仍然具有垄断属性，有必要对它们提供一个合适的激励性管制机制并实施监管。
英文摘要：
The business investment for power grids is sensitive to the management system and operational mechanism of the power grid in the electricity market. Since separation of the property right of the power grid from its dispatching right tends to cause ＂moral hazard＂, the simplest business investment mode for power grids was used to analyze the moral hazard problem for power grid companies and grid dispatching institutions under different circumstances, as well as the problem of grid maintenance under different transmission rights mechanisms. Based on that, it proposed that because of the monopoly of the power grid and the dispatching institution, it was necessary to provide them with an appropriate incentive regulation mechanism and to conduct supervision.
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