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中文摘要：
本文分析我国各地区的政府干预、法治和金融发展对地方政府控制的国有企业的银行贷款的影响。研究结果发现，地区的法治水平和金融发展水平越高，企业获得的银行贷款越少，贷款期限越短。这个结果与“法与金融”文献的理论预期和实证结果相反。本文的证据表明，产生这种差异的主要原因是地方政府有很强的动机通过干预银行的信贷决策给国有企业提供贷款支持，而法治和金融发展可以减少地方政府干预给国有企业带来的贷款支持效应。我们还发现，地方政府通过干预银行的信贷决策给国有企业提供的贷款支持是低效率的。
英文摘要：
This paper analyzes the effect of local government intervention, legal enforcement, and financial development on the bank loans of the state-owned listed companies controlled by provincial government. The empirical results show that the legal enforcement and financial development at the provincial level are negatively related to bank credit and debt maturity. These results are contrary to the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence of ＂law and finance＂ literature. Further evidence shows that the differences of the results between this paper and the ＂law and finance＂ literature result from the facts that the local government in China has strong incentives and power to eompel commercial banks to provide state-owned enterprises with favorable bank credit. And with strong law enforcement and financial development, favorable credit to the state-owned enterprises decreases. Additional evidence finds that favorable bank credit received by state-owned enterprises is inefficient.
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A new analytical model for thermal stresses in multi-phase materials and lifetime prediction methods
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