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中文摘要：
网上失信行为扩散阻碍了电子商务的发展,把握其演化规律是防止其扩散的前提。文章基于在线交易群体的视角,应用演化博弈理论,构建网上信用风险演化的博弈模型,并对模型进行推演和数值模拟。研究结果表明：仅考虑在线交易群体参与博弈的网上信用风险演化系统有四个均衡点,在线交易群体均采取失信策略的均衡点为演化稳定策略;网上信用风险演化是其他非稳定均衡点向这一稳定均衡点的演化过程;无论初始均衡点在何处,都将向演化稳定策略收敛,但初始均衡点影响了演化路径,三个非稳定均衡点形成了三种不同的网上信用风险演化路径。本研究的启示是必须对电子商务市场进行人为干预,设置有效防御机制。
英文摘要：
Dishonest ACTS diffusion has hindered the development of electronic commerce market, grasping its evolution rule is the precondition of preventing the spread of it. Based on the perspective of online trading group, application of evolutionary game theory, we constructed a dynamic game model of the evolution of online credit risk, and the model deduction and numerical simulation. The research results show that online trust risk evolution system, which only considers taking online trading groups to participate in a game, has four equilibriums, dishonest strategy equilibrium for the evolutionary stable strategy is adopted; online credit risk evolution is a stable equilibrium evolution process compared with other unstable equilibriums; no matter where the initial equilibrium is, it will converge the evolutionary stable strategy of convergence, but the initial equilibrium will affect evolution path, and three unsteady equilibriums formed three different evolution paths of online credit risk. This study shows that we must carry on the intervention of e-commerce market, and set up effective defense mechanisms for this study.
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