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中文摘要：
在考虑了电力投资市场的未来需求风险、电力市场的竞争压力以及政府对国有企业的管理偏好等因素的基础上构建了中国电力投资市场的竞争博弈模型.没有需求风险时博弈存在静态纳什均衡且不会发生羊群效应;当存在需求风险时,在政府对国有企业管理偏好的引导下,电力投资市场的竞争者迫于竞争压力将表现出投资决策的羊群行为,此时的电力投资市场满足博弈模型的条件.采用上述模型可以有效地解释实际发生的羊群效应和新一轮的投资热潮,最后对可能存在的投资过热现象提出了疏导建议.
英文摘要：
Considering the factors such as the future demand risk in electricity investment market, the competitive pressure in electricity market and the government＇s administration predilection to state owned enterprises, a competitive game model for electricity investment market in China is constructed. When demand risk does not exist, the static state Nash equilibrium exists in the game and the herding does not take place; when demand risk exists, under the guidance of government＇s administration predilection to state owned enterprises and by force of competitive pressure, the competitors in electricity investment market will be indicative of the herding behavior in their investment decision, and the electricity investment market will satisfy the condition of game model this moment. By use of above-mentioned model the herding occurred in the practice and the new round of investment upsurge can be effectively explained. Finally, a suggestion to dredge the craze that may exist in the investment behavior is proposed.
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