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中文摘要：
从发电权特性角度，针对“弃水”现象，剖析现有发电权交易中存在的问题。基于委托代理理论，提出了非对称信息条件下，无交易中心参与和交易中心以承包形式参与的发电权委托代理模型。通过分析激励合同中关键参数设定及其对交易各方风险分担份额、努力水平等的影响，分别比较了2种模式下采用不同激励合同的各方收益。算例分析表明，文中设计的激励合同可以在引导参与发电权交易各方获得最优收益的同时，使电力系统资源得到更有效的配置，提高社会总体效用，实现交易各方多赢。
英文摘要：
Stemming from the notion of generation right, the paper analyzes the problems existed in present generation right trades, and proposes generation right models without exchange center and with its contracts participation under asymmetrical information condition based on principal-agent theory, the objective is to encourage the usage of abandoned water adequately.Then the key parameters of incentive contract and their influence over participators＇ risk allocation shares and effort levels are studied, and the profits of participators in two models are compared. Numerical results show that the designed incentive contracts can optimize the profits of participators, improve the efficiency of system resources allocation, increase total,utility and make participators benefit multilaterally.
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